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Nishida and Merleau-Ponty
Art, “Depth,” and “Seeing without a Seer”
This paper sets Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Nishida Kitarō in dialogue 
and explore the interpretations of artistic expression, which inform their 
similar phenomenological accounts of perception. I discuss how both phi-
losophers look to artistic practice to reveal multi-perspectival aspects of 
vision. They do so, I argue, by going beyond a “positivist” representational 
under-standing of perception and by including negative aspects of visual 
experience (the invisible, absent, unseen) as constitutive of vision. Follow-
ing this account, I interpret artworks by Cézanne, Guo Xi, Rodin, and 
Hasegawa according to the versions of multi-perspectival vision articulated 
by Nishida and Merleau-Ponty. I conclude by highlighting a difference 
between Merleau-Ponty’s “depth” and Nishida’s “seeing without a seer” 
regarding the extent to which each of their philosophies de-substantialize 
and de-localize human vision.
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The different ways of depicting the human body, its flesh, anatomy, and movement are perennial subjects of artistic investigation, yet the body 
is not treated the same way in all aesthetic traditions. The body as studied by 
way of the nude—a foundation of Western art practice—is relatively absent 
from East-Asian art history. If there is a corresponding tendency in Chinese 
and Japanese art it is to minimize the body’s presence in favor of depicting 
the mountains, trees, and waters that surround the body and constitute its 
natural environment. Consequently, landscape painting entered art practice 
in East Asia almost one thousand years before it was taken up in Europe and 
North America.
The means of representation in art practice are reflected in philosophies 
that are likewise geo-historic. Striving to depict the ideal human body or 
landscape might not have been thinkable without ideas of transcendence, 
permanence, belief in an ideal realm and perfect forms; ideas associated with 
Greek culture in general, and Platonism in particular. In the East-Asian tra-
dition, where philosophico-religious ideas of immanence, impermanence, 
and aesthetic ideas of imperfection, asymmetry, and transience informed art 
practice, representing the ideal body or landscape have not been major fixa-
tions to the extent they have been in the West. 
One tendency that is common in both eastern and western traditions is 
a sustained interest in the complexities of visual experience, and particularly 
vision as it obtains beyond a limited uni-perspectival framework. While 
thinkers and artists in both traditions explore multi-perspectival aspects 
of vision, as I will discuss in this essay, historically eastern and western 
approaches have differed quite significantly. In the early-to-mid 20th cen-
tury, however, two philosophers at the forefront of both of these lineages 
moved towards a remarkably similar understanding of visual experience. 
Nishida Kitarō and Maurice Merleau-Ponty both articulate a multi-perspec-
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tival form of vision based on comparable ontologies of the perceptual body, 
and both do so by exploring artworks and the intricacies of the artistic prac-
tices that create them. This essay places these two philosophers in dialogue 
regarding their ideas of multi-perspectival vision and offers new interpreta-
tions of several eastern and western artworks according to their theories. 
Multi-perspectival vision
Nishida’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of vision and artistic 
expression are based on some of the most sophisticated accounts of the per-
ceptual body put forth in the eastern and western philosophic traditions. 
Because of the originality of their ideas, and because of the sometimes dif-
ficult idiom they are expressed in, it is difficult to understand their philos-
ophies on their own, and even more difficult to compare the two. When 
Merleau-Ponty writes, “It is the mountain which from out there makes itself 
seen by the painter,”1 and Nishida alleges that, “the mountains and rivers 
must also be expressive,”2 it can be tempting to read these and other similar 
passages as metaphorical or as poetically suggestive, and difficult to see how 
they imply a concrete ontology of the visual world or the artist’s body. Con-
trary to this, in comparing these philosophers, I interpret these and other 
similar passages as concrete descriptions of visual and artistic experience, as 
put forth in an idiom, which is appropriate to the ambiguity both philoso-
phers find at the heart of the relation of body and world. 
While these two thinkers challenge many philosophical assumptions 
regarding vision, much of what they take issue with is embodied in what 
has come to be known as the “representational” understanding of percep-
tion. While there is no single “representational” theory, the various offspring 
of this framework (also called “indirect perception”) share the common 
assumption that there is a metaphysical discontinuity between the perceiver 
and that which is perceived. To see is to receive visual data that cause mental 
images in consciousness, which are copies discontinuous with the objects 
perceived. I will argue that to adhere to these particular assumptions is to 
remain limited to a uni-perspectival account of vision, and to miss the rich 
1. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 128. 
2. Nishida 1970, 35. 
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complexity possible when going beyond this framework, as I will show 
Merleau-Ponty and Nishida do. 
The representational assumption excludes the multi-perspectival aspects 
of visual experience because of an underlying “positivist” ontology. I use 
“positivist” in the sense that vision is explained only by what is observable, 
measurable, quantifiable, etc., which in this case means vision is explained 
solely by sense-data impacting the human perceptual apparatus. This frame-
work leaves no room for the negative, for the invisible, the un-seen, or the 
perceptually absent features, such as memories, imaginings, fears, anticipa-
tions or desires to be included as part of the visual. A positivist might agree 
that these elements are related to or impinge upon the visual or perceptual, 
but because they do not arrive as positive sense-data, they are not counted as 
part of the visual or perceptual itself. 
With this division between the perceptual subject and non-perceptual 
object the dilemma remains regarding how the two interact.3 Four fur-
ther entailments of the representational assumption, which I will discuss, 
include, (1) upholding a strict dualism between the perceptual and non-
perceptual, (2) affirming an unambiguous relation between distance and 
touch, (3) understanding vision as limited to the surface of objects, and, as 
mentioned, (4) explaining vision as constituted by a uni-perspectival and 
frontal vantage point. In the following discussion I show how Nishida and 
Merleau-Ponty, as well as several artists, overturn all of these assumptions to 
go beyond representational positivism. In so doing they affirm on the con-
trary that (1) there is no non-perceptual anything; (2) distance and touch 
are ambiguous; (3) visual experience is ambiguous regarding surface and 
depth; and (4) vision is always multi-perspectival. 
3. Instead of trying to explain how the visual and non-visual interact, both Nishida and 
Merleau-Ponty conceive of all entities as ambiguously constituted by perceptual negativity 
and positivity. Subject and object can neither be completely continuous nor discontinuous, 
and as such Nishida proposes a “continuity of discontinuity” to explain perceptual encoun-
ter, while Merleau-Ponty refers to this relation variously as “chiasm” and “intertwining.” As 
Merleau-Ponty writes, “there is not identity, nor non-identity, or non-coincidence, there is in-
side and outside turning about one another” (1968). Similarly Nishida writes, “For in order for 
there to be the mutual determination of individuals, the external must be internal and the in-
ternal must be external” (1970).
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Representation and Positivity: Platonism and the “Three Graces”
Beginning with Greek epistemology and metaphysics, there has been a sus-
tained attempt in western philosophy to go beyond the limitations of a uni-
perspectival account of vision. According to Plato’s theory of forms, true 
vision of an entity was non-spatial; that is, not knowledge of an object from 
a single perspective, or a situated and limited spatial location, but a view, 
in a sense, from everywhere and, therefore, from no-where. To know some-
thing is to know its form, and Platonic forms are non-, or what amounts to 
the same thing, all-perspectival. While this might appear similar to multi-
perspectival vision, it is importantly distinct: As I will discuss, this account 
remains positivist and excludes the body’s vision as a source of knowledge. 
Knowledge of platonic forms was an intellectual not a bodily or even a fully 
visual way of seeing. 
As classical learning re-emerged in the Renaissance, various artistic 
strategies followed these Greek assumptions in seeking to go beyond uni-
perspectivalism. Artists and theoreticians participated in paragone, com-
petitions and debates that questioned which artistic medium offered the 
best depiction of the body, judged primarily on how many different points 
of view could be represented. Another strategy of the time, perhaps better 
known, as it is still used today, is the motif of the Three Graces. One of the 
Raphael, The Three Graces (1505). Reproduction 
courtesy of Château de Chantilly. Chantilly, France.
earliest examples is Rapha-
el’s rendition. This parti cu-
lar arrangement of bod ies 
in space—employed by 
among others: Boccioni, 
Rubens, Cranach, Botti-
celli, Canova and Rodin—
intends to overcome the 
poverty of a single and in-
complete point of view. 
Three bodies appear, yet 
they are meant to be a sin-
gle body revealing three 
different perspectives. The 
Graces stand together but 
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in various poses and angles such that any one perspective on the group tran-
scends the singularity of that vantage point and offers a more complete grasp 
of the body being depicted. An onlooker standing in any position can see 
not only the front of the torso, its flesh, and curves, but also how these relate 
to the tightness of muscles in the back, and flexing tendons in the neck and 
legs. One can stand face-to-face meeting one of the bodies’ gazes head-on 
while from the same position seeing another body from profile staring out at 
another onlooker. 
The Three Graces arrangement does offer more perspectives on the body 
being depicted, nevertheless its assumptions regarding perception fall short 
of multi-perspectival vision as articulated by later philosophers and artists. 
The Three Graces motif strives towards multi-perspectivalism, yet in trip-
licating the body the underlying theory of vision remains uni-perspectival. 
The additional perspectives are not found through expanding the singular 
vantage point, but by adding additional vantage points. Multiple perspec-
tives are therefore given by way of the artist’s tricks, but no advances towards 
multi-perspectivalism itself are actually achieved. The Three Graces realize 
extra perspectives by adding one and one and one discrete positive uni-per-
spectival views. Instead of finding the many perspectives within the single 
vantage point—as we will see with Nishida and Merleau-Ponty—the Three 
Graces gives many perspectives through many vantage points. Its meta-
physics of vision, therefore, remains uni-perspectival according to positivist 
and representational assumptions. 
The Negative and Invisible: Daoism and Guo Xi 
Throughout East-Asian art history there were techniques that sought to 
overcome the uni-perspectival vantage point, yet their philosophic under-
pinnings are quite distinct from those in the West, and quite distinct from 
the positivist representational framework. Experiments aiming at expand-
ing our understanding of vision are particularly prevalent where they were 
brought to their highest articulation, in the Northern Song Chinese land-
scape painting tradition. Guo Xi 郭熙 (1020–1090) was one of the great-
est masters of landscape painting, and his Early Spring 早春圖 is arguably 
the masterpiece of Chinese art. One of the painter’s strategies, called the 
“angle of totality” or “floating perspective,” depicted the landscape in mul-
tiple perspectives. The painter would not seek to make a representation of 
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the mountains or waters as though vision 
were constituted only by the single per-
spective he had while putting brush to 
silk, but instead depicted the landscape as 
it existed throughout time and from mul-
tiple perspectives: As it would look to a 
monk wandering through its paths, a fish-
erman docked on its banks, a farmer work-
ing on the tiny features of the ground, 
or a surveyor taking the perspective of 
the whole. In his work The Great Image 
Has No Form, or The Non-object Through 
Painting, Francois Jullien describes this 
multi-perspectivalism:
To paint the mountain will be to paint it as a 
“total” (hun) image, in its plenitude and com-
possibility: “high-low,” “great-small,” “turning toward-turning its back,” and 
so on, rather than to paint merely “three or five mountaintops.”… To paint 
is not to apprehend the mountain “in one locale” and from a “single corner” 
(Shitao, chap. 6). It is to paint the mountain after climbing many a hill and 
sketching many a varied mountaintop, after having one’s fill of hikes and 
vistas, after letting the infinite forms and resources of the mountain ripen in 
one’s spirit.4
The multi-perspectivalism arrived at by such a practice is importantly dif-
ferent from that which Raphael sought with his Three Graces. Prefiguring 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the representational or “camera” understanding 
of perception by almost nine hundred years, Guo Xi’s Early Spring reveals 
that vision is not constituted by a single positive perspective, but includes 
multiple perspectives arrived at by the ambiguity of positivity and negativ-
ity, visibility and invisibility, presence and absence. Guo Xi does not require 
many mountains as Raphael needed many bodies. The many are seen in 
the one. A single mountain is “the form of one mountain and, at the same 
time, of tens and hundreds of mountains…. A single mountain unites within 
4. Jullien 2009, 55. 
Guo Xi, Early Spring (1072). 
Reproduction courtesy of the 
National Palace Museum, Taipei.
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itself the aspect of several tens or hundreds of mountains,” writes Guo Xi.5 
The painter achieves multi-perspectivalism without having to multiply the 
object being depicted.
Daoist principles explain why and how painters such as Guo Xi explored 
vision beyond the uni-perspectival, and beyond representational positiv-
ism. Mutual-negation between being and nothingness is at the center of the 
Daoist worldview. For those Song dynasty artists and literati steeped in this 
worldview, it is not surprising that their works take an ambiguous approach 
to binaries such as the positive and negative, present and absent, visible 
and invisible. These Chinese painters knew that, “presence must give way 
to absence, that the visible turns inside out to become the invisible.”6 Like 
Merleau-Ponty and Nishida, Jullien frames the relation between the visible 
and the invisible not as one of duality, not as one standing beside or opposed 
to the other, not as visible here and invisible there, but as an ambiguous kin-
ship where the invisible is woven into the visible.7 Painters therefore “do not 
paint distinctive, much less disjunctive, aspects…. Rather, they paint them 
between “there is” and “there is not,” present-absent, half-light, half-dark, at 
once light-at once dark.”8
This aesthetic orientation towards ambiguous presence and absence, 
visibility and invisibility is consonant with one of the most basic tenets of 
Daoist philosophy derived from the well-known yin yang 阴阳 structure and 
its iconography. Traditional Chinese philosophy, aesthetics, medicine, mar-
tial arts, and science are based on this dynamic structure, which describes 
nature as constituted by an ambiguous relation between presence and 
absence. The complementary black and white forms of the symbol seem to 
suggest duality, or a strict distinction between presence and absence, light 
and dark, yet the small dot of the opposing shade in each form desubstan-
tializes that form, negates it, permeates it with its opposite, and maintains 
an ambiguous multi-stability between the two. The white is not perceived 
simply as white, nor is the black seen as exclusively black. The shades of both 
shapes are negated by their opposites, yet resist being unified into a single 
5. Ibid., 3. 
6. Ibid., 14. 
7. Merleau-Ponty says that the visible is “lined” (tapissé) by the invisible. (1993b 147)
8. Jullien 2009, 4.
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order. Yin and yang are not opposing forces but are in a “complementary 
opposition” representing the movement and harmony of nature. 
Daoist philosophico-aesthetic principles are well illustrated in the Jap-
anese painter Hasegawa’s famous Pine Trees (1593). There is an immediate 
striking contrast between what are taken to be the positive and negative 
spaces in this work, yet, as it is with the daoist yin-yang principle, the parts 
of the screen that are empty should not be thought of as pure absence or 
negativity while the dark trees are unambiguous presence and positivity. 
The fullness (you) is not separate from the emptiness (wu) anymore than the 
emptiness is divided away and remains opposed to the fullness, rather both 
“co-evolve” according to a mutual interpenetration and negation. Jullien 
explains that in such paintings presence is not beside absence, “presence is 
diluted and permeated by absence.”9 One is not opposed to the other: “pres-
ence and absence mingle continually, and that presence, far from aspiring to 
stand apart from absence, extends further and becomes distilled by virtue of 
it.”10 
Nishida’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies of perception and related 
philosophies of art are much more in line with this interpretation of Hase-
gawa’s work and much closer to the basic daoist approach to multi-perspec-
tivalism than they are with the western positivist representational model. 
This is because they arrive at multi-perspectivalism from within an ambigu-
ous relation between positivity and negativity, the visible and the invisible 
and therefore construe vision beyond the positivist representational frame-
work. I will show in the next subsection, how this multi-perspectivalism 
obtains as a seeing-seen relation between humans, and in the following sub-
section how it also obtains between humans and objects, finishing in Section 
4, with a discussion of how this ambiguity likewise holds for the supposed 
non-perceptual space thought to separate subject and object. 
Depth: Multi-Perspectivalism as Seeing-Seen 
Merleau-Ponty was already exploring multi-perspectival aspects of vision in 
Phenomenology of Perception,11 yet in his later works, particularly with his 
9. Jullien 2009, 2.
10. Jullien 2009, 11.
11. Merleau-Ponty 2003, 78.
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concept “depth” (profondeur), he develops the full implications of vision 
beyond the singular point of view. As he writes in Eye and Mind: “What 
I call depth is either nothing, or else it is in my participation in a Being 
without restriction, first and foremost a participation in the being of space 
beyond every particular point of view.”12
If we take the camera model of vision to be the standard from which we 
understand human vision, then we only account for the perceptually posi-
tive and remain within the uni-perspectival. What is negative is simply what 
the camera does not “see.” Yet, because, as Merleau-Ponty claims, the visible 
is “lined” (tapisser) with the invisible, humans have the possibility of a multi-
perspectival form of vision, which includes the visually positive as well as 
the negative. The negative of human vision is not a simple lack of vision or 
where vision does not reach. The negative, the unseen or the invisible consti-
tutes the visible. 
One way the invisible implicates itself in the visible is through the per-
spective others have on the world or on oneself. In a strictly representational 
approach, the vision we have of other bodies is understood only in terms of 
its positive visual-data, and, therefore, perceptual encounters between peo-
ple are understood as two related but ultimately separate visual phenomena. 
Yet, how we see things cannot be fully explained by the perceptual data we 
receive through our perceptual openness, because as Merleau-Ponty asserts, 
12. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 134. 
Hasegawa, Pine Trees (1593), left panel.
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“the other’s gaze on things is a second openness.”13 Included in our percep-
tion is an aspect of how we would be seen from the other’s point of view. 
Merleau-Ponty explains that, 
the invisible of my body can invest its psychic energy in the other bodies I 
see. Hence my body can include elements drawn from the body of another, 
just as my substance passes into them; man is a mirror for man.14 
Similarly, Nishida claims that “even our own bodies are seen from the out-
side… our body is that which sees as well as that which is seen.”15 Vision is 
multi-perspectival because, as Merleau-Ponty writes, we have “access to the 
very world the others perceive.”16
Both Nishida and Merleau-Ponty are united in conceiving of vision as 
ambiguously constituted by seeing and being-seen. The being-seen—in this 
case, the other’s gaze—counts in our vision but does not do so by being posi-
tively visible. If we could supplement our visual stream with a video-feed of 
another’s visual stream we would have multiple perspectives by the addition 
of the positive and the positive. This hypothetical form of multi-perspectival 
vision would remain positivist and would remain limited to seeing only. As 
seeing-seen, however, the other’s vision is implicated in my positive visual 
13. Merleau-Ponty 1968, 59.
14. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 130. 
15. nkz 8: 328.
16. Merleau-Ponty 1968, 57. 
Hasegawa, Pine Trees, right panel. Reproduction courtesy of Tokyo National Museum.
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experience as negative, as absent, invisible, but nevertheless constitutive of 
my experience. The invisible is not added to the visible; invisibility “lines” 
the visible. As such the body does not simply have vision, it does not just 
pick up sensory data, it never simply sees, it is always ambiguously situated 
between seeing and being seen from multiple-vantage points. 
Multi-perspectivalism as seeing-seen occurring between humans is one 
step closer to the account of vision Nishida and Merleau-Ponty put forth. 
To follow the full implications of their perceptual ontologies, however, this 
multi-perspectivalism must not only obtain between humans, while objects 
are taken to be non-perceptual. We must show how all of phenomenal real-
ity is part of the perceptual fabric, and how this further obscures the distinc-
tion between visible and the invisible, positive and negative. Turning then 
to Rosalind Krauss’s interpretation of Rodin, we must show how multi-
perspectival vision also muddies the binary opposition between surface and 
depth. 
Rodin’s The Three Shades
In 1899 Auguste Rodin cast an over life-size version of The Three 
Shades (Les trois ombres): the centerpiece of his life’s masterwork The Gates 
of Hell (La porte de l’enfer). Arranged according to the Three Graces motif, 
its three identical but counterposed figures offer multiple perspectives on 
the contorted bodies. In her work Passages of Modern Sculpture, one of the 
21st century’s most celebrated art-histori-
ans, Rosalind Krauss traces the history of 
sculpture and argues that one of the major 
concerns preoccupying practitioners before 
Rodin was the attempt to make the external 
surface of the body evince a properly propor-
tioned internal configuration. “Surface,” she 
adequately writes, “in traditional sculpture 
is understood to be a reflection of a pre-exis-
tent, internal armature or structure.”17 Krauss 
claims that although there is no actual skel-
17. Krauss 1981, 267.
Rodin, The Three Shades (1886). 
Reproduction courtesy of the 
Musée Rodin, Paris.
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etal morphology or underlying musculature, the perfection of the external 
surface of a sculpture is nevertheless judged based on how it suggests proper 
proportion, symmetry, and harmony between the internal and external. 
Krauss situates Rodin as a turning point in this tradition insofar as his sculp-
tures present bodies whose external structures are distorted such that they 
change the way vision operates regarding interiority and exteriority, surface 
and depth. “It is this communication between the surface and the anatomi-
cal depths that Rodin aborts,”18 writes Krauss. Our vision of Gates of Hell, 
she claims, “is stopped at the surface.”19 Krauss goes on to interpret a great 
deal of those western artists working in the wake of Rodin—from Brancusi, 
the Futurists, to Picasso, Philip King, Robert Morris and Richard Serra—
as exploiting a “unitary volume which dispenses with an internal armature, 
forcing all attention on the elaboration of its surface.”20 The forces these 
artists work with, she writes, act “over the surface of matter. Shaping those 
substances from the outside, these forces act with no regard to the intrinsic 
structure of the material on which they work.”21
Krauss’ conclusions are, however, in quite direct conflict with how the 
artist conceived of the relation between surface and depth in his work. 
Rodin claims that, 
Instead of imagining the various parts of the body as more or less flat sur-
faces, I represented them as projections of interior volumes. I endeavored to 
express in each swelling of the torso or the limbs the presence of a muscle or a 
bone that continued deep beneath the skin.22
Rodin’s understanding of his work is much more in line with the ambiguity 
of surface and depth found in Nishida and Merleau-Ponty’s writings. Despite 
her citing Merleau-Ponty, the claims she develops regarding vision and sur-
faces fail to consider the implications of his notion of depth and his wider the-
ory of vision. Although she does not consider Nishida’s writings, his concepts 
of “external perception” and “internal perception,” to be discussed, likewise 





22. Rodin and Gsell 1984, 25.
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Nishida and Merleau-Ponty offer a different way for understanding vision 
in relation to surface and depth, and Rodin’s work—and his own think-
ing about that work—are all very well articulated for helping to overcome 
the representational framework, which Krauss remains confined to. Before 
re-engaging Krauss’ claims, I would like to further explore how Nishida 
and Merleau-Ponty go beyond the representational and positivist frame-
work toward multi-perspectivalism, and beyond the surface-depth binary. 
Seeing-seen and internal-external-perception
One might accept the earlier proposal that the seeing-seen 
dynamic obtains in visual encounters between human beings, but it is more 
difficult to show how it is at work between human bodies and objects. Even 
though Rodin’s Three Shades present a likeness of human bodies, which rep-
resent perceptual beings, we think the three bodies of the sculpture only 
participate in the perceptual in a metaphorical sense or in so far as they refer 
to perceptual beings. Yet, going further with our philosophers in compari-
son, we come to understand that human vision is not exhaustively defini-
tive of the visual. Because the whole world is perceptual, it is not just that 
we see trees, for example, but that, as Merleau-Ponty explains, quoting 
André Marchand, the artist feels as though the trees looked back at him.23 
The visual is a perceptual fabric not limited to human vision. Thus Nishida 
thinks of human vision as only part of the worlds’ own “self seeing.”24 
To include objects as part of the visual, both Nishida and Merleau-Ponty 
develop alternatives to the positivist conception of vision and objecthood. 
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty gives an account of a revers-
ible multi-perspectivalism regarding objects. Reading the following passage 
while keeping in mind multi-perspectival perception constituted by positive 
and negative visual aspects, one can feel the richness of human vision, and 
the radical conception of perceptual objecthood that follows. 
To see is to enter a universe of beings… to look at an object is to inhabit it, 
and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they 
present to it. But in so far as I see those things too, they remain abodes open 
23. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 129.
24. Nishida 2012b.
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to my gaze, and, being potentially lodged in them, I already perceive from 
various angles the central object of my present vision. Thus every object is 
the mirror of all others. When I look at the lamp on my table, I attribute to 
it not only the qualities visible from where I am, but also those which the 
chimney, the walls, the table can “see”; but back of my lamp is nothing but 
the face which it “shows” to the chimney. I can therefore see an object in so 
far as objects form a system or a world, and in so far as each one treats the 
others round it as spectators of its hidden aspects and as guarantee of the per-
manence of those aspects. Any seeing of an object by me is instantaneously 
reiterated among all those objects in the world which are apprehended as co-
existent, because each of them is all that the others “see” of it. Our previous 
formula must therefore be modified; the house itself is not the house seen 
from nowhere, but the house seen from everywhere. The completed object is 
translucent, being shot through from all sides by an infinite number of pres-
ent scrutinies, which intersect in its depths leaving nothing hidden.25
Things are not opaque objects indifferent to perception. Because “things 
and my body are made of the same stuff,” Merleau-Ponty claims that vision 
does not just come about in me, but “vision must somehow come about in 
them.”26 Humans do not, therefore, introduce vision into the world all by 
themselves. Because all the world is visual, all entities are in a relation of per-
ceptual “donation and reception.”27 Likewise for Nishida, objecthood is far 
from the positivist understanding that frames it merely as extended matter. 
Objecthood for Nishida is something we as visual beings can lodge ourselves 
in and see the world from. “To view a thing aesthetically,” he maintains, 
“must mean to submerge the self within the thing in itself. In abandoning 
the self, one conforms to objectivity itself.”28 Objects are not experienced as 
mere light-reflecting matter but are perceptual entities with which our per-
ceptual bodies intertwine and see the world from. 
Nishida’s concepts “internal-perception” (内部知覚) and “external-per-
ception” (外部知覚) give an account of perceptual objecthood that explains 
this intertwining as an ambiguous surface-depth relation. While these con-
cepts initially seem to uphold an internal-external binary, Nishida writes, 
25. Merleau-Ponty 2003, 79.
26. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 125. 
27. Stevens 2009, 138.
28. Nishida 1973, 101.
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“there is no internal perception apart from external perception… the world 
of perception exists as internal-qua-external perception and vice versa.”29
Nishida approaches the issue of multi-perspectival vision from the point 
of view of what he believes to be an invalid distinction between “direct” 
and “indirect” perception. This is a distinction he thinks is wrongly indexed 
to perception and memory respectively. The positivist representational-
ist would define sensory-data received in the present as the only “direct” 
form of perception. Memories, imaginings, desires would be “indirect” and 
therefore not perceptual. Regarding the inside of an object—a dimension 
we might remember or imagine—the common assumption would be that 
because it is “not directly an object of consciousness must mean that it is 
not directly in sensory consciousness.”30 Yet, Nishida asserts that “there is no 
way for consciousness, which is not direct to exist.”31 Any type of conscious 
activity, thought, or memory “must be direct for us,”32 and therefore percep-
tual. Because all conscious activity is a part of sensation, 
when we see the exterior of a box it cannot be said that its interior is not 
directly an object of consciousness. For it cannot be said that in the pres-
ent the facts of the past are not manifested in consciousness…. Moreover, it 
cannot be said that the consciousness of thought, in comparison to sensory 
consciousness, is necessarily indirect sensation.33 
There are three possible counter-arguments to these conclusions that are 
important to consider. First, one could argue that we do not necessarily have 
accurate representations of the inside of objects, and therefore an unambigu-
ous distinction between surface and depth remains. No doubt we can always 
be mistaken or inaccurate, however the question is not whether the negative 
corresponds to the positive, but how it constitutes it. While we could be 
wrong about whether Rodin’s Three Shades are hollow or completely solid, 
our vision is nevertheless reaching below the surface with expectations that 
determine how the surface is perceived. One’s vision is always determined by 
intentionality exceeding what can be explained by the surface of objects or 
29. Nishida 1970, 189.
30. nkz 3: 214. 
31. nkz 3: 210 (emphasis added).
32. nkz 3: 210.
33. nkz 3: 214.
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by positive visual data. We could be wrong about this, but most of us would 
nevertheless be surprised if we scratched the surface of Rodin’s sculpture 
to reveal blue or red matter underneath. If it turns out that we are wrong 
about the inside, the surprise does not refute but actually evinces the inter-
nal-external ambiguity of visual experience. If vision were not ambiguous 
regarding surface and depth there would be nothing to be surprised about, 
and the object would not appear different when we make a discovery con-
trary to our expectations: Expectations are part of the visual and part of the 
way we reach behind, around and within objects. 
A second possible challenge to the idea that vision includes these nega-
tive, invisible aspects could be that multiple perspectives, or sensing absent 
aspects of an object, are achieved by remembering, imagining or modify-
ing experiences after-the-fact, and adding these to positive visual experience. 
The important thing to keep in mind is that—and in this sense both Nishida 
and Merleau-Ponty follow Husserl’s insight—the negative aspects are not re-
presented or re-called into consciousness to gain a fuller multi-perspectival 
picture of what initially hits the eyeballs as a single perspective.34 Nishida 
refutes the idea that thoughts or memories are non-perceptual aspects 
that are simply “connectable” to perception through second-order acts of 
cognition or reflection. “Concrete consciousness,” Nishida writes: “is not 
a union of independent sensations, but is rather continuous. This kind of 
continuous unity is precisely the activity of visual perception.”35 Likewise 
Merleau-Ponty ex-plains: 
My present vision is not restricted to what my visual field actually presents 
to me, for the next room, the landscape behind that hill and the inside or the 
back of that object are not recalled or represented. My point of view is for me 
not so much a limitation of my experience as a way I have of infiltrating into 
the world in its entirety.36
34. Husserl refutes the idea that vision is first frontally constituted and only following willed 
cognitive acts filled out by other perspectives. His response, and likewise Nishida’s and Mer-
leau-Ponty’s, is that there is no object that is not constituted by the “retended” past and “pro-
tended” future, by co-subjects and in co-intentionality. The multiple perspectives are included 
in the original presentation; in the immediate present the object is constituted with this hori-
zon of multi-perspectivalism, without the need to recall or re-present anything.
35. nkz 3: 146.
36. Merleau-Ponty 2003, 384. 
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Vision is not a “pure” perception constituted first exclusively by what 
reaches the eyes only later to be added to by memory or imagination of 
other views of an object. It is not that the uni-perspectival is given and the 
multi-perspectival is constructed: Perception is originally multi-perspec-
tival. It is the uni-perspectival that is the artificial, second-order perceptual 
state achieved after-the-fact by cognitive acts that abstract from the original 
multi-perspectival view. To assume otherwise is to treat both memory and 
imagination as entirely distinct from the perceptual. 
Because the negative—including memories, imaginings, fears, desires, 
anticipations, etc.—as well as the vantage point of others are included 
within the visual, our vision is always constituted by multiple perspectives. 
Therefore, when we see a house, Merleau-Ponty writes that, 
The house itself is not the house seen from nowhere, but the house seen from 
everywhere. The completed object is translucent, being shot through from all 
sides by an infinite number of present scrutinies, which intersect in its depths 
leaving nothing hidden.37 
A final objection could be that Nishida and Merleau-Ponty are promoting 
a version of the positivist goal of non-situated total vision from nowhere/
everywhere. The essential point is that according to both of their philoso-
phies, the object is “shot through” not by an intellectual form of vision but 
by the body’s vision. The “infinite scrutinies” are not achieved through intel-
lection, nor are they had by adding up many singular perspectives. With-
out needing to see the entire object—because negative and positive aspects 
are included in all perception—the single vantage point expands to multi-
ple vantage points. One need not triplicate a sculpted body, or even walk 
around to see different sides of an object, because from within every vantage 
point there are multiple views. “Every view of what is seen from the front is 
also a view of a hidden other side,”38 writes De Waelhens. The single vantage 
point gives multi-perspectives because, while the missing sides are absent, 
they nevertheless count in the perception of the visible sides. Whereas 
the positivist, the Greek, and Renaissance approaches achieve multi-per-
spectival vision by adding up several positive representations, Nishida and 
37. Merleau-Ponty 2003, 79.
38. De Waelhens 1973, 190. 
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Merleau-Ponty achieve multi-perspectival vision by revealing the negative 
within the positive. 
Surface-Depth: The Three Shades as Perceptual Objects
Rodin’s Three Shades are exemplary works for demonstrating the complexi-
ties of vision Nishida and Merleau-Ponty put forth. While Krauss does a 
great deal to illuminate sculpture in her writings, she remains within the 
representational understanding of vision and its various dualisms in claim-
ing that Rodin’s work holds vision on the surface of the Shades’ bodies. Far 
from halting vision on the surface, Rodin’s sculpture, its material, the tex-
ture of its flesh, its tormented musculature and contorted postures, and our 
bodily response to them, make palpable how vision goes far beyond what 
can be explained by light reflecting off of the surface of bodies. 
The dark bronze surface of the Shades has an ambiguous relation to the 
light that touches its surface, taking it all in while giving it all back. Wrought 
in what appears to be endless layers of pitch-black lacquer, the bodies com-
pletely absorb and nullify the light they receive, pulling one’s vision deep 
below the surface of their massive bodies, making one’s own body feel light 
in comparison. It feels as though their bodies have a depth where they are 
just as black in every particle all the way to their core. And while the tar-like 
surface takes in all the light, absorbing and nullifying it, that shiny surface 
at the same moment reflects back bright whites, making the bodies appear 
partly invisible, see-through, insubstantial and luminous. Their flesh returns 
a white that can only be so white because it negates the blackest blacks. 
The Shades’ flesh is by no means a simple “surface” nor is it simply dark 
as opposed to bright, heavy as opposed to light. There is no unambiguous 
visual exterior, but a dynamic between light and dark, surface and depth, 
perceiver and body perceived. 
One of the most prominent features of The Three Shades is their painfully 
elongated and contorted necks. This pain is significant because seeing the 
sculpture reveals that the discomfort is not simply perceived as located exter-
nal to one’s own body nor is it simply within the Shades’ bodies. Seeing a body 
includes a reiteration of how one would feel in those positions. In the case 
of the Shades’ contortions, we do not simply have a positive representation 
of their pain. Because, as Nishida believes, the “visual act [is] accompanied 
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by its own muscular sensation,”39 my feeling is more than a representation 
of another body. One does not merely see the necks painfully elongated as 
though the pain were situated only in their bodies, without any implications 
for one’s own. As Merleau-Ponty claims, our bodies can include “elements 
drawn from the body of another.”40 The feeling given back to me by these 
contorted figures reconstitutes my body as it is projected beyond its own sur-
face into the postures and pain the sculpture elicits. As the surface and depth 
of the Shades’ bodies are render ambiguous, so too is the relation between 
the bodies seeing and the bodies of the sculpture. One does not simply see 
and recognize their pain: An echo of one’s own body, its internal structure, 
its visibility and its vulnerability are felt when looking at Rodin’s bodies.
Implicit in Krauss’ understanding is the idea that the visual is limited 
to humans, and she therefore limits our encounter with this Shades’ to 
the visual data reflecting off of its surface, thus excluding many of the rich 
visual aspects from the encounter with this great work. To do so is to reduce 
human vision to the level of mere physiological mechanism, and to bring it 
down to the level of a camera’s apparatus, and to reduce the world to posi-
tivist conceptions of objecthood. The amazing thing about Rodin’s work 
is how well it allows us to feel many of the seeing-seen multi-perspectival 
aspects the positivist account excludes. One can be quite overwhelmed and 
go through a multitude of sensations, emotions, desires and cognitions all of 
which arise from within the visual. We desire to inhabit the bodies, we feel 
an anxious compulsion to touch the bronze, to see the bodies in motion and 
to see what they see. We feel at once elevated by their beauty, but feel the 
painful limits of our own bodies in the face of the genius that brought these 
works about. We suffer the inability to perceive such depth in the world or 
in bodies we look at. We want to see every gesture that went into the works 
while at the same time taking in the whole in one unmediated perception. 
These art-works would look different if these negative invisible aspects were 
not lining the visible. 
Because human perception includes the visible and invisible, positive and 
negative, sculpted bodies, or any object, are not perceived as “hard cores” 
39. Nishida 1973, 26. 
40. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 130. 
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of positivity but experienced as “shot through from all sides.”41 Objects are 
not perceived as the terminus of vision but “abodes” open to our gaze, and 
ambiguous regarding surface and depth and internal and external vantage 
points. 
Rodin’s success is, therefore, not had by making vision remain on the sur-
face of the bodies he sculpts. The external surface of his sculpture makes pal-
pable internal deformations that force us to feel their crippling pain inside 
our own bodies, or more properly speaking, feel a pain not located exclu-
sively in either body, but traversing the ambiguity of the internal and exter-
nal aspects of our body and the sculpted bodies. If vision rested on surfaces 
one would not have feelings of discomfort in one’s own body when seeing 
other contorted or disabled bodies, whether sculptured or human. 
“Non-perceptual” space:  
distance-proximity, visual-tactile
Artworks such as Rodin’s, and others Nishida and Merleau-Ponty 
discuss, are particularly useful for exploring perception, yet artworks are not 
the only site. The entire perceptual world affords such a visual experience. 
The final reversal that constitutes the full multi-perspectival form of vision 
is the inclusion of the world as a constitutive and active part of the visible. 
We have discussed how multi-perspectivalism obtains between humans, and 
between humans and objects. Now to explore the full ontological implica-
tions of Nishida’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of vision, we are left to con-
sider the space mediating between body and world in perceptual encounter. 
Although both Aristotle’s and Plato’s understanding of vision have inter-
esting exceptions to contemporary representational theory,42 they set western 
41. Merleau-Ponty 2003, 79.
42. In his Theatetus Plato develops his “activist” theory of perception where vision is so 
bound up as an essential way of world-revealing that he tries at every turn to avoid the unac-
ceptable conclusion that knowledge could be perception. Far from conceiving perception as the 
mere passive reception of sensory data, his activist model has it that vision extends out through 
the eyes into the perceptual field to meet the object. Perception is a “birth” not in the head, but 
at the juncture of the emanations arising from both the perceived object and perceiving subject. 
This model put forth in the Theatetus also called an ‘emission’ theory of vision holds that it is 
not just the fire outside the head that is responsible for vision but that there is fire inside the eyes 
themselves that goes out to meet the world. This notion of perception is far removed from the 
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thinking on the path of understanding vision as cutting across a non-percep-
tual intervening medium, which is distinct from the perceiving subject and the 
object perceived. Bodies are thought to be at a distance from each other, and 
vision somehow travels across non-perceptual space while the bodies perceiving 
remain at a distance, not touching. To challenge these representational assump-
tions we must question one last set of binaries, those separating distance and 
proximity, vision and touch. 
Bodies appear to be dispersed throughout our perceptual field, some 
touching and others at various distances from each other. One sees another 
body, a painting or sculpture across a room, and assumes that visual data 
is traveling between discrete bodies through non-perceptual space, and 
further assumes that this relation remains visual and at a distance unless 
one eliminates all of the intervening space by touching the object. This 
distance-proximity binary is one of the most basic assumptions structur-
ing how we distinguish visual from tactile experience, yet neither Nishida 
nor Merleau-Ponty make such a simple distinction. In his essay “Logic 
and Life” (1936) Nishida holds that, “we can probably consider the tactile, 
however, to be what is most real to us. Our world of sensory perception is 
constituted where visual and tactile sensations come together.”43 Similarly 
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the 
tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that 
there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the 
touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, which is encrusted 
in it, as, conversely, the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not 
without visual existence. Since the same body sees and touches, visible and 
tangible belong to the same world.44
If the visual and the tactile are related in this way, then the unambigu-
ous distinction between distance and proximity is problematic. To see is not 
modern empiricists’ representational assumptions, and like Merleau-Ponty and Nishida, Plato 
did not conceive of perception as the reception of mere sensory data, but involved the body ex-
tending into the visual world. The notion of a passive object being perceived and represented by 
an active perceiver was also foreign to Aristotle’s thinking. According to him, perception was 
the simultaneous actualization of both the perceiver and the thing perceived.
43. Nishida 2012b, 234.
44. Merleau-Ponty 1968, 134.
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to be at a simple distance from the object but is a way of being in contact 
with it. To see is to touch, it is “palpation with the look,” and to “have at 
a distance.”45 If when I touch something with my hand I have eliminated 
all the distance between my body and it, and if to see is a way of touching, 
then to see something cannot be to remain at an unambiguous distance. 
It is not the case that there are perceiving bodies here, perceived objects 
there, and a non-perceptual medium between the two. Yet, neither are 
the spatial distances between beings completely eliminated. We must not 
overcome the representational assumption that treats bodies as absolutely 
perceptually discrete by going to the opposite extreme to posit pure conti-
nuity. Merleau-Ponty approaches this problem by conceiving of the relation 
between bodies as “distanceless distance,” and invoking the same spatial-
ambiguity, Nishida posits a “continuity of discontinuity”46 (非連続の連続). 
To this effect Nishida writes: “A continuity of discontinuity is not simply a 
continuity, nor is it simply a discontinuity; and again, neither is it simply a 
jump from individual to individual; also, it does not mean that there is no 
connection between them.”47 Instead of non-perceptual space, the world is 
a “mass without gaps.”48 As Merleau-Ponty alludes to in a very East-Asian 
manner, there is not a collapse of identity between bodies: “there is not 
identity, nor non-identity, or non-coincidence, there is inside and outside 
turning about one another.”49
This position between perceptual continuity and discontinuity affords 
further comparison with Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of perceptual 
relationality as “chiasm.” Although Nishida did not refer specifically to a 
chiasmatic structure, several commentators observe that the logic of chi-
45. Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” 127.
46. While Nishida uses this term mostly regarding time, Krummel and Nagatomo read it 
more broadly as a general ontological principle arrived at through self-negation. As they write: 
self-negation (自己否定), which [Nishida] also considers a “continuity of discontinuity”  
(非連続の連続)…. We find that this dialectic [of self-negation] involves a chiasma of vertical 
and horizontal interrelations manifest in various types of relations—such as individual-
environment, person-person, subject-object, etc. (Nishida 2012b, 47) 
47. nkz 8: 257. 
48. Merleau-Ponty 1993a, 65. 
49. Merleau-Ponty 1968, 264. 
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asmatic relationality is reflected in his thinking, particularly regarding his 
notion of “continuity of discontinuity.”50 
The western tendency is to distinguish entities, to say where bodies begin 
and end, to circumscribe an organism and define it separate from its envi-
ronment, to eliminate ambiguity and uphold duality by identifying where 
bodies are continuous and where they are discontinuous. Within this 
framework vision and touch will inevitably maintain the binary of distance 
and proximity, yet if we go beyond the idea of a simple intervening non-
perceptual space, the idea of an unambiguous distance between bodies is 
likewise overcome. 
Multi-perspectivalism resolved:  
art as “seeing without a seer”
Both philosophers have similar accounts of the perceiver’s 
ambiguous relation with the visible, yet it can appear questionable whether 
Nishida goes as far as Merleau-Ponty regarding one last aspect of multi-
perspectival vision, and regarding developing a fully perceptual ontology. 
Nishida does posit that the external vision of an object includes a non-pres-
ent but nonetheless perceptual aspect of its inside, and does claim that “even 
our own bodies are seen from the outside,”51 yet initially at least, it appears 
that Merleau-Ponty goes one step further when he describes vision not just 
intertwining with but actually coming about from objects. He suggests this 
when he describes the painter’s feeling of being looked back upon by the 
forest, and when he writes that “if things and my body are made of the same 
stuff, vision must somehow come about in them.”52 
50. As several scholars have pointed out (Krummel 2015, Krummel and Nagatomo in 
Nishida 2012, Kazashi 1999, Stevens 2009, Brubaker 2009, Cipriani 2009), many of Nishida’s 
concepts are based on the same chiasmatic structure Merleau-Ponty employs, in that they in-
stantiate various aspects of the ambiguity between identity and difference. He does so regard-
ing temporality with his concept “continuity of discontinuity,” regarding the relation of the 
“historical body” (歴史的身体) to the “historical world” (歴史的世界), regarding logic with 
“self-identity of absolute contradictories” (絶対矛盾的自己同一), regarding motor-perception 
with his concept “acting-intuition” (動的直感), and regarding expression with “interexpression” 
(絶対に相反するものの相互関係は、表現的でなければならない).
51. nkz 8: 328.
52. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 125 (emphasis added).
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Exploring this possible discrepancy in the comparison we can, however, 
see that while Nishida does not posit specific objects in the perceptual field 
from which vision emanates, it might be that this absence is actually evi-
dence of his attempting to push multi-perspectivalism to a deeper level. 
Nishida does not posit any particular objects from which vision arises, but 
does conceive of vision beyond the subject-object distinction with his con-
cept “seeing without a seer” (見るものなくして見ること).53 This is Nishida’s 
attempt to give a truly non-psychologistic and non-internalist account of 
perception where vision arises in the world, yet is not localizable in either 
a subject or object. In this account of perception vision is not a human 
action but an event of a broader perceptual fabric. To posit “seeing with-
out a seer” is to retain the event of vision (seeing), and the fabric in which 
it arises, but to drop the centralized subject (seer) as the exclusive node to 
which vision is attributed, or an object to which vision is received. Seeing 
is not a subject’s act defined in opposition to an object, but is an event prior 
to the distinction between the two. When vision is conceived of without a 
subject as the entity in which it begins, this absence constitutes a thorough 
de-substantialization and de-localization of the perceiving subject, which 
conceives of multi-perspectivalism without discrete visual entities in which 
sight would originate: a reversibility so complete that there is no fixed locale 
from which perception emanates. In their commentary Krummel and Naga-
tomo explain, “here the meaning of ‘seeing’ extends beyond merely humans 
to encompass life or world in general.”54 
Merleau-Ponty also seeks to explore vision prior to the subject-object dis-
tinction, and also speaks of vision not as a feature exclusive to the human 
body, but as “a vision that we do not make but is made in us.”55 Yet, unlike 
Nishida Merleau-Ponty appears to want to maintain some minimal localiza-
tion of the perceiving subject. As he says in The Visible and the Invisible, “I 
am always on the same side of my own body.”56 Brook Ziporyn points to this 
passage and to Merleau-Ponty’s claim regarding Marchand, that the painter 
53. nkz 3:2 55.
54. Nishida 2012b, 360.
55. Merleau-Ponty 2007, 358.
56. Merleau-Ponty 1968, 81.
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wants to be “penetrated by the universe, and not want to penetrate it,”57 as 
evidence that the reversibility of Merleau-Ponty’s account of vision stops 
short of a full “reversibility of reversibility”58 and therefore remains a priori-
tization on the subject of vision. In conceiving of vision as the world’s “self-
seeing,” it appears that Nishida does want to take this extra step towards a 
fully reversible form of reversibility. For him, vision is an event of the per-
ceptual fabric of which body and world are co-constituted. It is the world, 
Nishida writes, that,
constantly itself sees itself. Thus we are able to say that it itself determines 
itself in custom. What, being passive, is dynamic is custom. All things are 
inert. But in the historical world, the concrete is not merely inert; it is what 
actively forms things, what sees things.59
Whereas there is a discrepancy in the extent to which the philosophers 
want to take multi-perspectivalism, both conceive of this type of seeing as 
related to a de-localized form of motor-perception as exhibited in artistic 
expression. The world “at its root, is also a world whereby historical nature 
sees by making,”60 writes Nishida. And because “making is seeing and see-
ing is making” it is not only that the historical world sees by making, but 
the world “makes continuously via seeing; to make is simultaneously to 
see. Life in this sense must be formatively (造形) artistic.”61 The move-
ments of history, of which the painter’s body and its expressive motions are 
one instance, are an exemplar of this type of “seeing.” One way of being an 
artist is to engage the world as it determines itself through its self-seeing. 
Cézanne is Merleau-Ponty’s exemplar because in his expressive gestures he 
likewise demonstrates a de-localized form of motor-perception where the 
artist is not the sole moving or seeing entity, and, therefore, in his practice a 
body-world ambiguity obtains where “it becomes impossible to distinguish 
between who sees and who is seen, who paints and what is painted.”62
57. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 129.
58. Ziporyn 2009, 80.
59. Nishida 2012a, 135.
60. Nishida 2012b, 255.
61. Ibid.
62. Merleau-Ponty 1993b, 129.
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